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Introduction. Echoes from the Present  
The primary goal of the ESPES Journal is to promote dissemination of contemporary approaches in the field 
of Aesthetics and the Philosophy of art. One way to do this is by publishing general, non thematic issues that 
can provide the readers with a realistic snapshot of the discipline in its current state, outside and beyond the 
constraints of its academic capacity.  
Among the things that can be argued about aesthetics today, one is especially true: heterogeneity. As never 
before, the field is characterized nowadays by a great variety of styles, attitudes, and methodologies that make 
it look like a jagged land - a discontinuous and irregular ensemble of diverse interests and concerns. Presumably, 
this plurality is the result of internal developments happened in the artistic discourse of the twentieth century, 
which lead to an increasing complexity in artistic practice in the first place, and in art theory in the second.1  
Whatever its exact causes, though, this situation can create a sense of dizziness in those approaching the field 
for the first time. Finding a clear path in the mare magnum of theories, schools, attitudes that emerge from 
current aesthetic theorizing may seem like trying to find one’s bearings without a compass. And yet, for the 
professional aesthetician, this vertiginous plurality is but a striking sign of the vitality of the discipline itself. In 
the absence of a single direction, of stable and well-rooted philosophical traditions, scholars are today free to 
choose, to invent, to make their own independent discoveries outside the cage of ready-made ideologies. 
Interestingly, this freedom also gives one the chance to engage in a more creative relationship with the past. 
Retracing the past, indeed, goes along with exploring new territories towards yet unforeseen areas of interest.  
Without any attempt to reduce this complexity, our goal in the present issue of ESPES is to provide a 
temptative ‘topography’ of the diversified theoretical experiences that compose the scope of contemporary 
aesthetics. The aim is not to present a comprehensive anthology of the discipline and its sub-branches, one 
able to cover all issues that are discussed today in aesthetic fori.  Such a venture would be a priori doomed to 
failure, nor is a perfect representation of reality on a one-by-one scale what a topography is primarily meant to 
do. Rather, our attempt is to shed light on some significant patterns of current aesthetic discourse that can 
serve as landmarks facilitating the exploration of the field.  
As the reader will observe, all the eight essays that comprise this collection focus on issues that are, albeit 
different from one another, emblematic of a number of debates in contemporary aesthetics. Most of these 
papers provide a re-interpretation of a variety of old problems - the status of kitsch, the complex subject of art 
reception and interpretation, the ontology of art, the notion of post-historical art - that represent tòpoi in the 
history of aesthetics. Others seek to inaugurate a contemporary and unprecedented perspective - the notion of 
                                                     
1 See Welsch, 1992, p. 387 
Adrián Kvokačka & Lisa Giombini                                  Contemporary Aesthetics. A Topographic Attempt 
4 
projective aesthetics, a different idea of aesthetic education. In any case, whether they commit in dialogue with 
tradition or attempt to uncover new theoretical avenues, all the texts presented here bring an original 
contribution to the clarification of the various problems they address. In the remainder of this Introduction, we 
will briefly address these papers individually so as to highlight how each of them may serve as a useful 
benchmark that can help us draw the map of today’s aesthetics.  
Old Problems, New Solutions 
Max Ryynänen’s insightful article Kitsch Happens provides a re-evaluation of the negative characterisation of 
kitsch as pseudo or bad art that has been raging in much aesthetic investigation of the 20th century. 
Questioning the assumption that kitsch is not possible in nature but only in representations of nature (Kulka, 
1994), Ryynänen analyses the case of landscapes to ask whether natural phenomena can be a possible source 
for experiences of kitsch. This leads him to reconsider the history of the concept, from its first theorization in 
the work of Clement Greenberg to the latest tendencies of so-called “pro kitsch art community” (Nerdrum et 
al., 2001). While, according to Ryynänen, in earliest years kitsch was mainly examined “from the outside” just 
to be condemned as fiercely contrasting with true Art (i.e., modernism, in Greenberg’s terms) and authenticity, 
a “second wave” of research on kitsch was initiated by Umberto Eco’s (1997), and Tomáš Kulka (1994). In 
this period, kitsch started attracting the curiosity of scholars as a phenomenon of interest in itself, worthy of 
serious examination and scientific analysis. Finally, in the last few years, “a third wave” of studies on kitsch has 
emerged, which emphasizes the positive aspects of kitsch and examines how kitsch as a concept and as a form 
of sensitivity can vary according to the different countries and cultures. “Authors on this side of the millennium” 
Ryynänen writes “are no longer much interested in good/bad art (which for them is just good/bad art) or the non-legitimization 
of certain forms of e.g. (lowbrow) painting, when they discuss kitsch.”  
Interestingly, it is in the light of this more recent evolution of the notion that the question of nature as a source 
of kitsch becomes possible. Indeed, according to Ryynänen, once we stop looking at kitsch as a despicable 
phenomenon and begin considering it as a shared cultural ‘heritage’ – a part of “our cultural a priori”, in his 
words – we can come to recognize kitsch as something that simply happens, and that we can therefore 
recognize also in nature – in a sunset for instance –  as a trace of the images or pictures we have learned to see 
and identify. This consideration brings Ryynänen to a redefinition of the notion of the Kitschmensch, as someone 
who, rather than simply lacking so-called ‘good taste’, is instead visually “programmed” to appreciate kitsch, 
to the point of being led to make choices, even perhaps moral choices, on the basis of her implicit identification 
of kitsch (consider the use of sentimental and kitschy images to drive people to charity).  
A more critical consideration of kitsch characterizes Doron Avital’s and Karolina Dolanská’s dense 
contribution, From Tomas Kulka on Kitsch and Art to Art as a Singular Rule. Drawing on Kulka’s concept of a 
Popper-inspired aesthetics, the authors contend that kitsch works can be defined as alteration-resistant: they 
cannot allow for any change in their form – whether better or worse – because each possible variation is in 
principle able to replace the original item without loss of aesthetic value. Since it cannot be falsified, kitsch is 
only pseudo-art. What indeed defines true Art (like true science in Popper’s account) is, according to Avital 
and Dolanská, the possibility of its being improved upon, thus ‘falsified’; in other words, its capacity to survive, 
as it were, the ‘falsifiability test’. But what are these variations about? And how do they relate to the specific 
“perceptual Gestalt” that, in Kulka’s terms, that makes each single work what it is? According to the authors, 
a distinction that helps clarify the matter is that between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of the work of art. Variations 
affect the way (i.e. how) a work’s perceptual Gestalt (i.e. what) is presented.   
This distinction provides the basis for Avital’s and Dolanská’s criticism of Kulka (1994). Thinking, with Kulka, 
that there exists a single, constant, unchangeable ‘what’ for every work of art is for the two authors misleading, 
since the different manners and conditions according to which a work can be presented and experienced (its 
how) necessarily intrude upon what we consider its Gestalt (i.e., its what) to be. To explain this, the authors 
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refers to the famous example of the duck-rabbit: when we switch the figure and the background in the picture 
(either the duck or that of the rabbit), we also switch the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. In this sense, the distinction 
between the ‘what’ and ‘how’, between figure and background, is far less clear-cut than it may appear, and 
should be conceived of as open to our “free play” among competing visual readings. This is also compatible, 
according to the authors, with the notion of a work of art being a ‘singular rule’ in itself. This notion is 
important for aesthetic appreciation, because it determines the extent to which a given work succeeds or fails 
in complying with the standard it itself has posited and thus provides us with a parameter to assess how valuable 
the work is. It is only to the extent that a work is a singular rule that it can qualify as a proper ‘Work of Art’ as 
well as, in Kantian terms, as “the mark of genius”; this, Avital and Dolanská conclude, is just another way of 
claiming that kitsch does not count as art.  
Expanding on the relation between an artwork’s possible ‘variations’ and aesthetic appreciation is also Vlastimil 
Zuska’s paper Non-structural version of the variational method - the explanatory weakness of Gestalt, the limits of imagination 
and rejection of the Other. Commenting on Kulka’s (2019) notion of ‘variational method’, Zuska claims that what 
we regard as ‘altered versions’ of a work of art are in fact just imaginary constructs, characterized by a different 
ontological status with respect to the object of our actual perception (the work before our eyes). In this sense, 
they cannot receive the same kind of consideration we accord to the real artwork when it comes to aesthetic 
appreciation.  
Just like Avital, Zuska criticizes Kulka’s use of the concept of a unique non-aesthetic perceptual Gestalt 
determining the identity of an artwork. Using the ‘figure-background’ scheme as an example, he points out 
how certain pictures, like for instance the duck-rabbit, are bistable and do not allow for any singular reading, 
and concludes therefore that the assumption of the uniqueness of the perceptive Gestalt is misplaced. In fact, 
according to Zuska, the main flaw of Kulka’s account lies in its recourse to the notion of Gestalt. Quoting Jan 
Mukařovský, Zuska argues that the structure of a work of art, meant as a whole, is hierarchical, i.e. it contains 
subordinate and superior components, so its totality cannot simply be reduced to a “Gestaltquatität”. In this 
sense, the concept of structure seems to him more productive when it comes to explaining artworks’ intrinsic 
ambiguity, because – unlike the rigidness of the notion of Gestalt – it involves the idea of a vital interaction 
among the work’s components and the context. Able as it is to account for the interactions taking place among 
the work’s parts as well as between the work and the living artistic tradition that comprises it, structuralism 
offers us a method that outreaches the limits of Gestalt as such.  
A further concern, according to Zuska, is represented by the fact that Kulka is not clear about the reasons why 
the method of ‘alterations’ should constitute the best way of addressing aesthetic problems. Even the 
introduction of the three core notions of unity, complexity and intensity, according to Zuska, does not help 
him avoid some form of skepticism, mainly because at least two of these notions, unity and intensity, rely on 
the viewer’s ability to correctly interpreting the work. When evaluating a work of art, viewers are indeed prone 
to overemphasize unity among the work’s parts, while disregarding all the elements that may disturb the whole. 
This suggests that the method of alteration is unable to exempt us from misunderstandings and errors of 
assessment.  
The modalities through which works of art are usually perceived and evaluated lie at the core of Ondřej 
Krátký’s paper Perception, Length Of Its Duration, Evaluation: Various Authors, Related Observations. Focusing on the 
case of artistic ‘texts’ (a term which is taken by Krátký to refer to all genres of artistic production - from 
literature and painting to music, movies, sculpture) the author examines what he refers to as the ‘linear’ facet 
that characterises the spectator’s perception. According to Krátký, the standard way recipients have to 
approach a text is by gradually gaining a sequence of perceptions of it, until the moment the text is somehow 
“replete” in their eyes. In this sense, Krátký claims, the more ‘static’ an artistic text is (like a painting for 
instance) the greater will be the activity required on the part of the recipient to appreciate it.  
Referring to Paul Grice’s conversational theory (1975), Krátký argues that the main goal underlying all forms 
of artistic creation is an effort, on the part of an artist, to communicate a certain message to an audience. In 
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this sense, art appreciation can be seen as implying an “exchange” between the artists’ communicative intent 
and the recipients’ perception of such intent. According to Grice, ideal communication in conversations occurs 
when all so-called maxims of conversation (cooperation, quantity, quality, relation) are respected by the speakers. 
Nevertheless, according to Krátký, in the case of artistic texts, effective communication can be obtained also 
by intentional violations of the norms that ground the expectations of the recipient.   
Violation of the recipients’ expectations is indeed a tool often used by artists to produce a certain 
communicative effect on the part of the spectator, which Krátký identifies in a phenomenon of ‘arousal’. 
Arousals are not necessarily negative, but may in fact have a positive effect on the recipient. In this sense, 
according to Krátký, artistic communication succeeds both when the spectator’s expectations are fulfilled and 
when the spectator is brought, by experiencing a state of ‘arousal’, to “jump” to a different reading or 
perception of the work itself. Our evaluation of an artistic text, thus, does not strictly depend on how much a 
text meets our expectations. Predictability and unpredictability - i.e., the qualities of an object to either meet or 
fail our expectations - are in themselves neutral features that can be perceived as good or bad (“welcomed” or 
“unwelcomed” in Krátký’s terms) by different people in different situations. Accordingly, one recipient may 
interpret an artistic text negatively because of its unpredictability, while the other can appreciate it exactly for 
the same reason. This, however, leads Krátký to raise the following question: when it comes to appreciating an 
artistic product, are we expecting the unexpected or are we rather expecting the expected? 
In his captivating contribution, Projective Aesthetics as a Possible World, Boris Orlov explains the nature, origins 
and purposes of the approach he calls “projective aesthetics” (Orlov, 2015, p. 43) as well as its possible role in 
the development of future discourses in aesthetics. Projective aesthetics, Orlov claims, prospects a new way of 
understanding aesthetic practices, one resting essentially on three main pillars: Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of 
‘schizoanalysis’ (2010) as stemming from the important concept of rhizome; a so-called ‘conceptivistic 
methodology’, where conceptivism stands for an interpretation of philosophy as concept-production; and, 
third, the notion of projectivity, meant as a practical way of engaging with the dimension of aesthetics. This 
practical engagement, that Orlov ascribes to Dewey’s pragmatism and Berleant’s aesthetic thinking, turns 
projective aesthetics into a non purely theoretical discipline, aiming to account for all the aesthetic experiences 
potentially happening at any time and any place of human everyday life. Because of its shift from theory to 
praxis, the object of projective aesthetics must be re-configured in terms of the two related phenomena that, 
Orlov contends, contribute in equal way to making our experience of the world meaningful, what he calls 
aestheticization and artification of reality. It is the goal of projective aesthetics to potentiate our aesthetic taste so 
as to enable us to “saturate our life” by way of aestheticizing or artificizing it to its maximum. In this sense, 
projective aestheticians do not simply investigate what is beauty or what is art, but explore “how to bring [...] 
beauty or artistry in their own life”.  
Relevantly, it is mainly in virtue of its practical connotation that projective aesthetic can enter into dialogue 
with some of the most innovative approaches characterizing contemporary aesthetic field, from everyday 
aesthetics to environmental aesthetics, contemporary art practices and media aesthetics. A common feature of 
all these approaches - however different they may be from one another in content and concern - is indeed that 
they all interpret aesthetics as a dimension that is able to provide us with something existentially significant, 
potentially capable of transforming our whole being. The transformative power of aesthetic experience also 
represents an important element in Orlov’s educational practice as an aesthetic teacher. Beyond the constraints 
of traditional ex cathedra academic communication, embracing projective aesthetics can lead to the 
implementation of educational projects in which students are allowed to engage personally and practically with 
the aesthetic dimension, for example by relying on their own experience of beauty or with their own sensitive 
body. 
An interest in education also features in Jana Migašová’s paper Black Mountain College Case: Transformation Trends 
in Art Education in the First Half of the 20th century. Migašová analyzes the case of the Black Mountain College, a 
college operating in Black Mountains (North Carolina, United States) from 1933 to 1957, alma mater to many 
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famous artists such as Josef Albers, John Cage, Walter Gropius, Willem de Kooning, and Robert Rauschenberg, 
among the others. Focusing on the role played by John Dewey’s pragmatism and progressivism on the 
educational approach implemented in the college, Migašová investigates the relationship that tied the American 
school to another important institution of that time - also groundbreaking in concept and vocation - namely, 
the German Bauhaus. Like Walter Gropius’ school in Weimar, the Black Mountain College was clearly devoted 
to both practical and formal instruction in the field of liberal arts, including subjects as mathematics, 
psychology, economy, etc. Placed at the core of the education delivered by the academy, art was seen as 
providing a synthesis between the humanities and the natural sciences, a dimension capable of bringing 
together all the multiple facets that comprise culture.  
This was in fact the idea of one of the school’s leading figures, the German painter and teacher Josef Albers, 
to whom Migašová devotes a large part of her contribution. A former member of the Bauhaus who emigrated 
to the United States in the Nazi period, Josef Albers had distinctive opinions concerning the role of education 
in society and politics, which he derived, according to Migašová, from his own practice as an artist. In his 
educational ‘manifesto’, Concerning Art Instruction, Albers conceived art as both the “experimental arm of 
culture” as well as a way to create meaningful forms, what he saw as the prerequisite of cultural production 
and progress. In his courses at the College, Migašová tells us, Albers followed Dewey’s conception of the 
learning by doing, beginning each lesson with exercises of a practical nature (like measuring, dividing, estimating 
etc.) that, to his mind, could strengthen students’ handicraft capability and, subsequently, their freedom to 
engage in more personal kind of work. One important part of Albers’ educational methods, according to 
Migašová, was indeed attributed to training the learners’ discipline - where discipline was, however, meant in a 
strictly “anti-academic” way. The role Albers granted to freedom for exploration and experimentation in his 
teaching activity at Black Mountains College, his understanding of art as necessarily related to ethics and 
politics, and, more generally, his progressive ideas concerning education may, according to Migašová, represent 
an interesting model for re-conceiving our higher education, especially in the field of arts, in a more progressive 
and democratic sense.  
Lisa Giombini’s paper Descriptivism in Meta-Ontology of Music. A plea for Reflective Equilibrium, inaugurates a shift 
toward the realm of ontological and meta-ontological investigations about the arts. Drawing on current 
discussions in analytic aesthetics concerning the methodology underlying musical ontology, Giombini 
examines one of the most popular positions in the debate, namely, descriptivism. As a general meta-ontological 
approach, descriptivism can be traced back to a tradition coming prominently from Peter Strawson’s (1959), 
who introduces it to discuss the broader issue of determining the task of general metaphysics. According to 
Strawson, metaphysics should be aimed at describing “the actual structure of our thought about the world” 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 9) as reflected in ordinary language. Applied to the case of music, this implies that our best 
ontological theories of musical works are those which prove consistent with our intuitive thought and discourse 
about actual practice, more than with the abstract claims of metaphysics.  
Despite its current success among scholars, descriptivism raises in fact, in Giombini’s perspective, a whole 
number of issues, the first being the role it assigns to our pre-theoretical intuitions about music as the main 
sources for ontological theorizing. This, according to Giombini, is especially problematic because of the 
contradictory nature of intuitions themselves. For example, there seems to be a broad variety of intuitions 
underlying what we believe an authentic performance of a musical work is, all in conflict with each other. It is 
therefore unclear how we should choose between them and which of them we must elect as the foundation 
for our ontology. Moreover, Giombini contends, it seems also disputable whether descriptivism is really able 
to offer us any form of non-trivial knowledge, given that its deliberate task is to codify the regularities found 
in our intuitive discourses about musical practice. 
A possible way to redeem descriptivism against these lines of criticism, according to Giombini, might be 
through reference to the so-called method of reflective equilibrium, as famously envisaged in the field of ethics by 
John Rawls (1971). As a philosophical method, reflective equilibrium refers to a procedure aimed at revising, 
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adjusting or filtering our pre-theoretical intuitions, so as to achieve the higher possible level of consistency 
among the judgments that have stood up under rational examination. Importing this method in the framework 
of ontological inquiries about music, Giombini argues, might help descriptivism overcome some of the 
difficulties entailed in recourse to intuitions, thus making it more resistant to objections. What is more, 
reflective equilibrium could also have an impact on the type of knowledge achievable by means of a descriptivist 
ontological theorizing. Indeed, according to Giombini, by acknowledging some degree of revision in our 
intuitive conception of musical practice, we end up with a knowledge that is not just trifle codification of the 
already-known.   
In her inspiring contribution, Daniela Blahutková presents a different perspective on a subject that has 
attracted the attention of theoreticians for decades if not for centuries, namely, that of the end of art and of 
the fate of art in the post-historical period. This topic, commonly referred to the thought of Hans Belting and 
Arthur Danto, is complemented in Blahutková’s paper with the work of the relatively less known philosopher 
and sociologist Arnold Gehlen. Post-history, in Gehlen’s perspective, corresponded to the crystallization of a 
culture which was modern, technical and shaped by the avant-garde - a culture, however, in which syncretism 
of styles and creative production survived. As Blahutková highlights, to explain the notion of post-history 
Gehlen resorted to the idea that both the present and the future state of society were the result of an internal 
development of humankind according to three different stages, prehistory, history and posthistory, each 
identified by a different character. Gehlen’s conception of art and of the logic behind the historical progress 
of pictorial rationality were based, according to Blahutková, on his view of the relationship insisting between 
art and social institutions, natural sciences, the bourgeoisie, and the industrial society of the 20th century.  
Writing in the 1950s, Gehlen contended - somewhat pessimistically - that society was static and that no stimulus 
for a change could be expected - no “new horizons, breathtaking utopias”. At the same time, however, he 
maintained that posthistory did not represent the finale stage of human existence. Since posthistory was, to his 
mind, the product of cultural crystallization, he emphasized the value of experimentation (both as an artistic 
process and as a symptom of the spiritual atmosphere of the industrial era), transformation and multiplication 
spreading both in post-historical culture and in art. As Blahutková underlines, this aspect explains why the 
avant-garde signified, for Gehlen, a new hope against the process of social crystallization. The emergence of 
the avant-garde had to be understood as the onset of subjectivity in the arts, associated in turn with the crisis 
of institutions such as state or religion. However, experimentation in the avant-garde art did not represent, he 
contended, a real form of artistic progress, mainly because of avant-garde persisting commitment with such 
institutions.  
Relevantly, knowing that our post-historical society no longer requires art to fulfill its needs could give us, 
according to Gehlen, further opportunities to socialize, integrate, and coordinate our actions. Gehlen’s attempt 
to devise an art theory despite his post-histoire diagnosis emerged from a need to investigate the boundaries 
of art and his concept of art as a vehicle of reflection. This is why, Blahutková concludes, Gehlen’s example 
may still be relevant for our culture today. 
Conclusions  
What lesson could we learn from this tour into the jagged topography of contemporary aesthetics? From a 
purely academic viewpoint, the most relevant idea is probably the multifaceted nature of aesthetics as a field, 
intertwining philosophy, the theory of perception, sociology, art history and art criticism and addressing issues 
that go far beyond the realm of art and art theory.  
Although the papers presented here do not answer to all the problems they raise – perhaps because there 
simply are no straightforward, easy answers – they all show originality and insightfulness in the particular way 
in which they put the relevant questions. To our mind, this is in fact one of the key aspects of any valuable 
theoretical investigation (in all fields): rather than finding solutions, raising the issue in a novel and interesting 
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way. This might also represent a way for aesthetics to cross the boundaries of the academic world and reach 
the interest of the general public, thus resisting to the increasing marginalization and excessive specialization 
to which all scientific disciplines are subject nowadays. We hope this issue will make a little contribution to this 
process too. 
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